Marquette Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 December 1940: A Symposium on Freedom

Article 4

Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure
Thomas A. Fairchild

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Thomas A. Fairchild, Freedom From Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 25 Marq. L. Rev. 13 (1940).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol25/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

FREEDOM FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
THOMAs A. FAIRCHMD

T

HERE is no doubt that the freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental and cherished American right. The more

specific phraseology of this right "to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures" appears
in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in Article One, Section

Eleven of the Constitution of Wisconsin. Such controversy as exists
with reference to this right relates to the two questions:
1. What sanctions shall be employed in the protection of the
right? and
" 2. What are the limits of reasonableness in searches and seizures?

Historically, the exercise of power which was condemned as abuse
by the constitutional authors included the issuance by the English Secretary of State of general warrants for searching private houses for

the discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be used to
convict their owners of the charge of libel," the chief political crime of
that date, and the issuance in the colonies of writs of assistance to
the revenue -officers empowering them in their discretion to search
suspected places for smuggled goods.2
Relief against the administrative practice of issuing general warrants was afforded by resolutions of the House of Commons condemning them. The judicial remedy for those subjected to such search as
exemplified by the celebrated Wilkes case and Entick v. Carringtonwas
an action of trespass against officials involved. 3 It may be maintained
that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment did not extend beyond a

prohibition of general writs and warrants and a guarantee of a civil
cause of action against the perpetrators of an unreasonable search.
A further protective device has now been embodied in a rule of evidence in the federal and some of the state courts, including Wisconsin. 4
This is the familiar rule that where one sovereign has conducted an
unreasonable search or seizure, evidence obtained is inadmissable in a
criminal trial in the courts of that sovereign at least if the objection is
timely.
It is apparently conceded that the common law rule was otherwise,5
In 1926, out of 45 states considering the question, 14 had adopted the

I Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
2

Ibid.

a Ibid.

4 Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N.W. 89 (1927) ; State v. Baltes, 183 Wis.
545, 198 N.W. 282 (1924).
5 J. B. Waite, Reasonable Search and Research, 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 623.
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federal rule but 31 had rejected it.6 The first case which suggests the
rule is Boyd v. United States, decided in 1885. 7 An opposite conclusion
was reached in Adams v. New York" in 1904. In 1914 the Supreme
Court held in Weeks v. United States9 that a defendant by timely motion might force the prosecution to return to him material unlawfully
seized. The full blown rule developed during the prohibition era. a
The sanction of this rule does not apply to all unlawful searches
and seizures and may therefore be ineffective in discouraging them.
Evidence so obtained by a private individual is admissible in any court.
In a state court evidence wrongfully obtained by federal officials or
officials of sister states is admissible. In the federal court evidence so
obtained by state officials is admissible. Apparently evidence obtained
by anyone through search and seizure violating the rights of persons
other than the defendant may be received.
Judge Cardozo in an opinion rejecting the rule" commented as follows upon this point: "The federal rule as it stands is either too strict
or too lax. A federal prosecutor may take no benefit from evidence collected through the trespass of a federal officer. The thought is, in
appropriating the results, he ratifies the means. He does not have to
be so scrupulous about evidence brought to him by others. How finely
the line is drawn is seen when we recall that marshals in the service
of the nation are on one side of it and police in the service of the
states on the other. The nation may keep what the servants of the states
supply. We must go farther or not so far. The professed object of the
trespass rather than the official character of the trespasser should test
the rights of government."
A recent extension of the doctrine into the field of telephone communications commands attention. In Olmstead v. United States'2 decided in 1927 the Supreme Court held admissible relevant testimony
of conversations overheard by federal officers who had tapped telephone lines, notwithstanding the fact that the wire tapping was done
in the state of Washington where a statute made such conduct a misdemeanor. It was held that the Fourth Amendment, while protecting
papers and personal effects, did not protect projections of the voice over
telephone wires. The decision was 5 to 4.
In 1937 in Nardone v. United States'3 the court held that such evidence was inadmissible, explaining the change in opinion by reference
6People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
7116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).
8 192 U.S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct 372, 48 L.Ed. 484 (1904).
9232 U.S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1913).
9a J. B. Waite, Reasonable Search and Research, 86 U. OF PA. L .REv. 623.
10 E. C. Arnold, Search and Seizure Problems, 16 TENN. L. REv. 291.
"People v. Defore, -242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
12277 U.S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 72 L.Ed. 944 (1928).
13302 U.S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937).
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to the Federal Communications Act' 4 which provides a penalty for the
interception of a telephonic or telegraphic communication or the divulging of its contents, no part of the statute provided that evidence so
obtained should be inadmissible. In 1939 in Weiss v. U. S. 84 L.Ed.
223, it was held that the rule applied to both interstate and intrastate
communications and that the government might not rely upon the testimony of one of the parties to a conversation which testimony was
elicited as a result of wire tapping by the government. In Vardone v.
U. S. 84 L.Ed. 227, it was recognized that evidence resulting from wire
tapping not initiated by federal officers would be admissible.
At this point it is of interest to note that Wisconsin has a statute
which penalizes the interception of telegraph messages,'- but apparently none with respect to the telephone. The new constitution of the
state of New York contains the traditional provision but adds that
the right of the people to be secure in their telephonic and telegraphic
communications shall not be violated.,
The second branch of controversy upon search and seizure is the
question of what is a reasonable search. Traditionally, the rule has
been that a search is unlawful unless made pursuant to a proper warrant or made as an incident of or immediately following a lawful
arrest.
It is noteworthy that the word "unreasonable" is the one used in
the Fourth Amendment and is one which implies that circumstances
alter cases. The law upon the question of unreasonable search is probably another field where changing times demand changing rules. A
search unreasonable in the days of the adoption of the Constitution because an officer might have obtained a proper warrant, may be reasonable in these days of rapid communication and transportation because
the detection of the criminal will otherwise be impossible.
Prof. John B. Waite of Michigan' s has criticized the failure of the
courts to adopt some scientific or statistical procedure for the determination of this question of policy. Without saying what view is necessarily correct, he points out two alternative definitions of reasonable
search which the courts might have adopted as follows:
1. A search is reasonable whenever the officer making it has reasonable ground to believe that he will discover evidence of criminality
and reasonable ground to believe also that such evidence cannot be
obtained by more dilatory or less drastic procedure.
2. A search is reasonable where the search proves the person involved to be guilty of crime.
"*47
U.S.C.A. 605.
'5 Wls. STAT. (1939) § 348.37.
16 N. Y. Constitution, Art. I, § 12.
"7E. C. Arnold, Search and Seizure Problems, 16 TENN. L. REv. 291.
Is j. B. Waite, Reasonable Search and Research, 86 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 623.
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In the consideration of both of the matters in controversy namely
the question of whether the rule excluding from criminal trials evidence obtained by unlawful search is a proper means of enforcement
of the right and the question whether the traditional rules of reasonableness are proper today, there is a conflict between two interests.
The one interest is the protection of society through the detection of
criminals. The traditional rule is criticized by Judge Cardozo expressing this interest as follows: "The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."' 19 The other interest is that of protecting individuals from the annoyance of governmental interference with their
private affairs. In a dissenting opinion in the Olmstead case Justice
Brandeis made the following interesting speculation: "Moreover, 'in
the application of a constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been, but of what may be.' The progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop
with wire-tapping. Ways may some day be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advance in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed
beliefs, thoughts, and emotions. 'That places the liberty of every man
in the hands of every petty officer,' was said by James Otis of much
lesser intrusion than these. To Lord Camden a far slighter intrusion
seemed 'subversive of all the comforts of society.' Can it be that the
Constitution affords no protection against such invasion of individual
security ?"
Justice Holmes expounded this second interest and said that he
thought it "a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the
government should play an ignoble part."
Commenting upon this statement of Justice Holmes, Professor
Waite in the article above referred to said "Passing over the question
of distinction between what is ignoble and what is pragmatically wise,
did Mr. Holmes know how many criminals do in fact escape because
of the narrowness with which courts choose to define reasonableness?
Possibly definitions might be broadened if judges knew that. The numbers run into thousands, though how many thousands the writer does
not know. In the city of Detroit alone a cursory investigation revealed
the fact that during a single year 38 indubitably guilty carriers of concealed weapons, a felony punishable by five years imprisonment, were
turned loose on society by the courts-and many more by the policesolely because the courts did not approve as reasonable the manner in
which the arrest and subsequent search was made. That was a period
when armed robbery, assault, and murder were rife in the city, yet
19 People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
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the investigation indicates that one out of every four gunmen arrested
was released by the courts or by the police themselves because the
court's idea of reasonableness differed from those of the police."
Referring again to the decisions involving wire tapping it is pertinent to ask whether the tremendous advantages of telephonic communication are by the rule mentioned to be made safe for use in
furthering various crimes and conspiracies or whether the rule should
not be relaxed and governmental agencies aided in detecting the criminals who perpetrate such crimes.
Our discussion is oriented with respect to the concept of civil liberties and our attitude is certainly in favor of their preservation. Reference to the cases, however, which proclaim the rule of inadmissibility of evidence unlawfully obtained, discloses a long list of gamblers,
smugglers, dealers in illicit liquor, gunmen, and thieves who have
claimed and received protection from effective prosecution upon the
basis of this guarantee. In speaking of civil liberties, we do not refer
to freedom to violate criminal laws with impunity. The question is
therefore posed whether the rule of the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained and the traditionally strict rule as to what is an unreasonable search are protecting what we call civil liberties or are merely
protecting those whom most of us have no desire to protect.
It will undoubtedly be argued that this is another field in which we
have to take the bitter with the sweet, and that in order to have protection from government spying to convict people of crime for political
reasons we must endure the protection of the ordinary criminal.
I have referred to the growth of the rule of exclusion during the
prohibition era, an illustration of the use of power by the courts to
protect individuals from the strict enforcement of a criminal law, the
law being increasingly unpopular and unacceptable.
Assuming in the future the major threat to freedom of thought
under a dictatorial regime popularly accepted because of a general disappointment in the inefficiencies of democracy or because of war
accompanied by governmental propaganda and laws which we would
now consider unconstitutional restricting the freedom of thought, do
we suppose that the courts will protect the free thinking minority by
strict maintenance of the present rules? The creation of the present
rules in order to hinder the enforcement of an unpopular law affords a
basis for prophecy that they might be relaxed for the enforcement of a
popular law. If such a result should occur, citizens would then regret
the protection of the criminal in the present day through the enforcement of the present strict rules.
Vigilantism is frequently more disastrous to the offending individual than criminal prosecution. It is easy to imagine a hysteria akin

18
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to the 5th column scare of the recent spring and summer which would
result in mob persecution of persons insisting on freedom of thought if
the rules of the courts made legal prosecution difficult. Another question is therefore posed-whether the protection which may be afforded
by the present rules upon the subject of unlawful search and seizure
in a future time of mass interference with individual rights will be
sufficiently valuable to render worthwhile the evils protected by such
rules at the present time.

